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Abstract
Because of the substances they process and the conditions of operation, chemical plants are systems prone to the
occurrence of undesirable and potentially dangerous events. Major accidents may occur when a triggering event
produces a cascading accident that propagates to other units, a scenario known as domino effect. Assessing the
probability of experiencing a domino effect and estimating the magnitude of its consequences is a complex task, as it
depends on the nature of the substances being processed, the operating conditions, the failure proneness of
equipment units, the execution of preventive maintenance activities, and of course the plant layout. In this work, we
propose a stochastic modeling methodology to perform a probabilistic analysis of the likelihood of domino effects
caused by propagating vapor cloud explosions. Our methodology combines mathematical models of the physical
characteristics of the explosion, with stochastic state-based models representing the actual propagation among
equipment units and the effect of maintenance activities. Altogether, the models allow predicting the likelihood of
major events occurrence and the associated costs. A case study is analyzed, where various layouts of atmospheric
gasoline tanks are assessed in terms of the predicted consequences of domino effects occurrence. The results of the
analyses show that our approach can provide precious insights to support decision-making for safety and cost
management.
Keywords: Vapor cloud explosion, Stochastic models, Domino effect, Risk analysis, Cost analysis
Introduction
Chemical process plants are an example of critical sys-
tems. In these systems, the occurrence of undesirable
events such as leakage of materials, uncontrolled fires, and
even explosions may result in catastrophic consequences,
including harm to human life integrity.
The consequences of an undesirable event may be dis-
astrous, and the magnitude of effects depends on several
factors. Some of these factors are easier to consider, such
as the characteristics of the materials being processed
(e.g., reactivity, flammability) and the operational con-
ditions (e.g., temperature, pressure). Some others, such
as the consequences of a wrong plant design or the
incorrect management of equipment are more difficult
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to understand and to account for. Catastrophic events
are usually related to an initial hazardous event or sce-
nario, which subsequently escalates to greater and more
dangerous magnitudes. Escalation may trigger a chain
of unwanted events whose effects progressively increase
both in space and time, until producing a single, major
accident. When this happens, we talk about a failure
domino effect [3].
Failure domino effects in chemical plants can occur
because of a handful of reasons. The very first occurring
event in the chain of unwanted scenarios is known as the
triggering or initiating event. This is usually a fire (either
pool fire, jet fire, flash fire, fire ball, etc.) or an explosion,
e.g., a vapor cloud explosion (VCE), or a boiling liquid
expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE). Subsequent events
can be of any kind, and they are not necessarily mutu-
ally exclusive, meaning that a triggering jet fire can end up
causing both a BLEVE and a fireball [36].
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In this paper, we study the domino effect of VCEs,
where both the main triggering event and the subsequent
events are VCEs [16]. VCEs occur when a large amount
of flammable material is released into partially congested
atmospheres and such material does not ignite immedi-
ately [14]. Rather, it accumulates and generates a cloud of
flammable vapor, i.e., gas or mist, with enough chemical
energy to generate flame speeds that accelerate to suffi-
ciently high velocities to produce significant increase of
vapor pressure (overpressure).
VCEs are particularly dangerous because they can easily
provoke explosions that lead to domino effects, due to the
accumulation of flammable materials in a growing cloud
[22]. The explosions generated from such events can rise
to destructive levels, making them one of the worst possi-
ble cases in chemical industry. Analyzing domino effects
of VCEs is thus of special importance for guaranteeing the
safety of plants in this industrial domain [17].
The objective of this work is to help understanding
safety hazards in chemical plants, by proposing a system-
atic methodology to quantify the probability of occur-
rence of failure domino effects after an initiating VCE
event. To this end, we propose a modeling methodology
that combines mathematical models of the physical char-
acteristics of the explosion, with stochastic state-based
models representing the actual propagation among equip-
ment units and the effect of maintenance activities. In
particular, we use the multi-energy method [3] for blast
estimation, and discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs)
[35] and stochastic activity networks (SANs) [31] for the
modeling of propagation effects.
The approach consists of three phases: (i) we first char-
acterize the likelihood of occurrence of VCEs affecting
chemical process units, then (ii) we model the conse-
quences of a VCE in terms of the impact that the energy
release may have on neighboring units, and finally, (iii)
these two elements of risk are embedded into stochastic
state-based models that are used to represent the spatial
arrangements of equipment and to simulate the propaga-
tion of events, finally estimating the probability of domino
effects affecting different equipment units.
This paper is an extended version of [33]. With respect
to such work we provide the following extensions:
– We allow for a more accurate characterization of the
failure process of individual equipment units. While
in [33] the failure times were exponentially
distributed, which means only constant failure rates
were considered, we now generalize failure times so
that they can be gamma distributed. The gamma
family of distributions, which includes the
exponential one as a special case, can model the
effects of the equipment aging process, such as
wearing, on the failure rate.
– We provide an analytic model based on DTMCs for
analyzing the domino effect. While in [33] the
analyses required discrete-event simulation for all the
metrics of interest, the DTMC model can provide
exact results for a subset of them.
– We extend the SAN models to consider maintenance
activities. Compared to [33], more interesting
scenarios can now be analyzed, in which the
probabilistic losses that might occur due to domino
effects can be traded with the certain costs to be paid
for maintaining equipment units in the plant. Cost
analyses can thus be conducted to identify the most
profitable schedule of maintenance activities.
– Finally, we restructure the document and we add
three new sections with a deeper discussion of
background, related work, and limitations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
the “Vapor cloud explosions” section, we introduce the
necessary background on VCEs, while in the “Related
work” section, we discuss the work related to this paper.
In the “Modeling methodology” section, we provide an
overview of the modeling methodology and we define the
metrics of interest that we aim to estimate. The “Modeling
of one-step VCE propagation” section details the mathe-
matical modeling of the physical characteristics of a VCE
and its propagation to nearby units, while the “Modeling
of domino effects” section presents state-based stochas-
tic models that will be used to estimate the propagation of
failure domino effects. In the “Case study” section, a case
study based on atmospheric gasoline tanks is presented
and modeled using our methodology, providing an exam-
ple of application. Finally, in the “Limitations to validity”
section, we discuss the main limitations of the method-
ology, and in the “Conclusions and future work” section,
we present concluding remarks and we discuss possible
future enhancement of this work.
Vapor cloud explosions
Equipment in a process plant may fail, causing unwanted
consequences. For a failure to happen, a root cause (also
called initiating event) must firstly occur. Then, other
intermediate events may happen until the occurrence of
the final failure effect or failure mode. After a failure
has occurred, it may produce more severe consequences
(also called final events), which may also depend on other
external events.
The main focus of this work are VCEs, which are
final events. In the middle, the considered failure mode
is the loss of containment, i.e., a leak. A VCE event is
essentially the explosion of a “vapor cloud,” an agglomer-
ation of an important amount of flammable mass. Such a
cloud can be formed due to the accumulation of vapors
or from liquid spills that are subsequently evaporated.
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Once the cloud is formed, there is a risk it may explode.
However, in order for the cloud to be able to produce
an explosion, the following three main conditions must
hold.
1. The substance in the cloud must be within its
flammability limits. These are temperature limits
within which it is possible for a flammable substance
to ignite, depending on the kind of substance.
2. Ignition must be delayed. In case the cloud starts
burning before it is completely formed, other fire
scenarios would occur instead of a VCE. Such other
events are out of the scope of this paper.
3. Turbulence must be present in the cloud. The release
mode of the substance (a jet, for instance) can trigger
this turbulence. Interaction with close-by objects
may also work as partial confinement and generate
turbulence within the cloud.
Once the explosion happens, a part of the chemical
energy produced by the combustion reaction will turn
into mechanical energy, resulting in a blast wave. Blast
waves produce a pressure increase that builds up in a first
moment due to the combustion, but that subsequently
diminishes thanks to the expansion of gasses [24]. This
increase of pressure is called overpressure, and it charac-
terizes the blast wave of any explosion. The amount of
overpressure depends on the type of explosion. In this
work, we focus on detonation processes (i.e., large and
instantaneous explosions) [10].
Immediately after the explosion starts, an overpressure
peak is produced, which moves through space, dimin-
ishing as distance increases. Blast estimation methods
model the dependence of the produced overpressure on
the distance from the detonation point and the amount of
releasedmass. They thus permit quantifying the overpres-
sure experienced at a certain distance from the explosion
point.
There is not a single agreed way of performing blast
estimation, and three main methods are most commonly
used:
– TNT equivalency, which first calculates the
equivalent mass of trinitrotoluene (TNT) that
would generate such explosion, and then uses
this value for further overpressure calculations.
– Multi-energy, which bases its calculations on the
fact that the explosion behavior is in large part
determined by confined parts of a vapor cloud.
– Baker-Strehlow-Tang, which differs slightly
compared to the multi-energy method in that the
strength of the blast wave is proportional to the
maximum flame speed that the cloud has reached.
In this model, the speed is an input parameter.
In this work, we will use the multi-energy method as
the basis for overpressure calculation, given its simplic-
ity in terms of required input parameters and its wide
acceptance concerning the faithful representation of the
dynamics of an explosion [26].
Related work
VCEs are regarded as one of the potentially most dis-
ruptive events in industrial plants. For this reason, sev-
eral works have analyzed their behavior, their possible
causes, and their consequences. However, to the best of
our knowledge, a comprehensive methodology is not yet
available, and VCEs modeling is still an active research
field.
Different aspects of VCE modeling are being investi-
gated in the literature. Some works focus on the initiation
process, that is, the triggering of an initial VCE. For exam-
ple, the authors of [28] estimate the probability of the
occurrence of a VCE based on stochastic variables like fre-
quency of material release, probability of not having an
immediate ignition, and meteorological conditions.
A major challenge in studying VCEs lies in the fact that
their impacts are difficult to be quantified. For this rea-
son, many works focus on modeling the direct effects of a
VCE, which consists in estimating the energy released by
the explosion and the propagation of the blast. Although
some well-known blast estimation methods exist (e.g., the
multi-energy method, see above), they only provide an
approximated result. Research work is thus devoted to
improve the accuracy of these methods, or understanding
VCE behavior under specific conditions.
The authors of [36] propose a method for taking into
account channelling and shielding effects when estimat-
ing the blast pressure, while in [11], the authors studied
the blast wave of elongated VCEs. In fact, most work
assumes that the cloud of flammable material participat-
ing in the VCE is hemispherical, which is however rarely
the case, due to congestion caused by other equipment.
More in general, the authors of [37] examine the effect
of the geometrical shape of the flammable cloud on the
explosion, analyzing a constant volume of clouds with dif-
ferent height-width ratios and length-width ratios. Other
works, as in [13], focus on the prediction of the VCE blast
resulting from the leakage of a specific material.
Another research direction consists in validating the
existing models. The authors of [27] studied and cali-
brated the multi-energy method in different scenarios,
by comparing the obtained results with detailed com-
putational fluid dynamics simulations. More recently,
the authors of [2] extended a method for blast estima-
tion from the literature and compared its predictions
with the damage observed in four real historical acci-
dents. Some studies have performed risk assessments
on VCEs [1], although very few have tried modeling
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and assessing the impact of domino effects caused by
VCEs.
Petri nets and their extensions are widely used for the
assessment of safety-critical systems and critical infras-
tructures. For example, the authors of [12] used (untimed)
Petri nets to model interdependencies between criti-
cal infrastructures and to verify that specific invari-
ants are not violated. SANs have been used in [21] to
define an approach for the evaluation of the risk asso-
ciated with the execution of maintenance operations
on petroleum installations. Similarly, the work in [6]
defined a framework based on SANs to model and eval-
uate the impact of cascading effects in electric power
systems.
To the best of our knowledge, few works have used
stochastic models to characterize domino effects caused
by VCEs. The authors of [40] use timed colored hybrid
Petri nets (TCHPNs) to model response actions to
flammable liquid tank fires. The focus is on comparing dif-
ferent emergency strategies to avoid the domino effects,
and not on evaluating the consequences. The recent work
in [15] gives a definition of vulnerability index of tanks
in the context of a domino effect scenario and proposes
a methodology to evaluate it, by combining different
techniques. However, they do not consider maintenance
effects.
The work in [38, 39] proposes a methodology based on
Petri nets to model the cascading effect of VCE accidents,
and it is perhaps the most similar to ours. However, our
work takes also into account for: (i) time, (i) the effect
of maintenance, and (iii) costs. Furthermore, we adopt a
modular approach in the construction of themodel, which
simplifies its adaptation to different scenarios.
Modelingmethodology
VCEs are dangerous events that besides entailing capital
losses and operation disruptions also represent extreme
safety hazards for personnel operating in chemical plants.
An explosion occurring at an element of the process may
propagate to other equipment units and produce other
kinds of unwanted events. In this work, we restrict our-
selves to consider only initiating events of VCE type, and
we also assume that secondary or propagated ones are
also of that type, ignoring other unwanted events different
from VCEs.
In the following, we provide an overview of the pro-
posed methodology (“Overview” section), together with
themain assumptions onwhich it is based (“Assumptions”
section), as well as the measures of interest that we aim to
calculate (“Metrics of interest” section).
Overview
The proposed modeling methodology is described graph-
ically in Fig. 1. The figure describes the workflow that
should be followed for modeling and analyzing VCE
domino effects in a generic industrial plant.
We model VCEs as probabilistic events, according to
the following three steps: (i) initiation modeling, (ii)
propagation modeling, and (iii) domino effects modeling.
Initiation modeling basically consists in characterizing
the failure process, that is, determining the probability
distribution of initiating events. Propagation modeling
consists in determining the individual (i.e., one-step)
propagation probabilities between equipment units i and
j, based on their distance and on mathematical models
of VCE physical characteristics. Finally, in domino effects
modeling, such information is aggregated into different
types of probabilistic models, namely DTMCs and mod-
ular SANs models, that can represent the domino effect
process. Such models are solved analytically and eval-
uated by discrete-event simulation to obtain the final
metrics.
Initiationmodeling
Models for the distribution of the time to the occurrence
of different types of failures have been proposed in the
literature. Commonly accepted approaches for industrial
processes equipment are to use the Weibull [5] or gamma
distributions [34] to represent the random nature of fail-
ure times. Both these distributions have the particularity
of being characterized by the rate and the shape factor,
which makes them particularly convenient for represent-
ing the aging process of equipment.
In this work, we use the gamma distribution to model
the time to failure of an equipment unit, that is, the
time to the occurrence of an initiating event (i.e., a VCE)
caused by that unit. The gamma distribution is com-
monly used to model fire-related initiating events similar
to those we consider in this paper. For example, in [34],
the gamma distribution was used to model “fire or explo-
sion” and “large release” events on hydrogen containment
equipment.
The specification of a gamma distribution requires two
parameters, a rate λ and a shape k. The rate parame-
ter can be interpreted as the frequency of “shocks” (i.e.,
adverse events) to which the equipment is subject, while
the shape can be interpreted as the number shocks until
failure [23], thus effectively modeling degradation caused
by aging.When the shape parameter is k = 1, the distribu-
tion coincides with the negative exponential distribution
with constant failure rate λ, thus reducing to the case we
previously considered in [33].
Suppose the chemical plant comprises a set
E1,E2, . . . ,En of n equipment units. We model the
time-to-failure (TTF) of equipment unit Ei as being an
independent non-negative random variable TTFi, with
known gamma probability distribution of parameters
λi > 0 and ki > 0. The cumulative distribution function
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Fig. 1Workflow of the proposed modeling methodology
of TTFi has the following analytic form [23]:
Prob[ TTFi ≤ t]= γ (ki, λit)
(ki)
, t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (1)
where the parameter t represents the current time, (k) is
the gamma function, and γ (k, t) is the lower incomplete














The initiating VCE event may occur at any of the
equipment units. The time of its occurrence is a random
variable Tinit = mini{TTFi}. We will only consider one
initiating event, and all the other VCEs that may possibly
happen would be caused by direct or indirect propaga-
tion of the initial one. We made this choice because in
this work we want to analyze the domino effects of a single
VCE initiating event in isolation. While it would be per-
fectly possible to consider multiple initiating events with
our approach, it would make it impossible to establish the
relative contribution of each single initiating event on the
observed final effects.
Propagationmodeling
For a chain of failure events to occur, the energy released
in the initiating VCEmust be sufficiently high to affect the
neighboring units. Obviously, the odds of event propaga-
tion depend not only on the amount of released chemical
energy, but also on the closeness of other equipment and
on the susceptibility of the involved substances to igni-
tion. Moreover, the domino effect is not deterministic, but
rather probabilistic (i.e., propagation may not happen).
Several studies in the literature have proposed statistical
models to predict the likelihood of a piece of equipment
being affected by the explosion of neighboring units (see
the “Related work” section). Here, we use thosemathemat-
ical models to parametrize state-based stochastic models
that can represent the dynamic evolution of the state of
equipment units, accounting for the occurrence of initial
events and for the possible routes of VCE propagation. In
particular, we base on studies in the literature to extract
the probability pij of a failure of VCE type propagating
from unit i to unit j, as a function of the distance between
units and of the released energy. This step of the method-
ology is further detailed in the “Modeling of one-step VCE
propagation” section.
Domino effect modeling
For the modeling of the actual domino effects, we will
be considering two distinct approaches. First, we use the
propagation probabilities to parametrize a DTMC model
that can be used to analyze the consequences of an ini-
tial event, when the propagation times are abstracted.
For these simplified scenarios, the DTMC allows obtain-
ing the exact value of the metrics of interest when time
is abstracted. Second, we build a stochastic Petri net
model for representing the occurrence of the initiating
and of the propagation events, this time explicitly mod-
eling the event occurrence times. The Petri net model
allows obtaining statistical approximation of all the met-
rics of interest via discrete-event simulation.
Petri nets are useful mathematical tools for modeling,
analyzing and simulating different kinds of systems, which
were initially proposed in 1962 by Petri in his Ph.D. disser-
tation thesis to model concurrent systems [25]. They have
two basic types of modeling elements: places, depicted as
hollow circles and representing state variables of the sys-
tem, and transitions, depicted as empty rectangles, which
represent system changes or occurrence of events. Places
can contain tokens, which model entities, depicted as
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black dots, and the number of tokens in a place at a cer-
tain moment is called themarking of the place. Tokens are
added or removed to/from places of a Petri net according
to transitions and to the connections between places and
transitions, which specify enabling for transitions as well
as the changes in the marking of the places upon their
occurrence.
The rules that specify the dynamic evolution of the
marking are called firing rules [39], and they are easily
understood by observing the example of a Petri net shown
in Fig. 2. The example shows a possible modeling of the
state of a unit which can be functioning (a state repre-
sented by place Up) or failed (modeled by place Failed).
The event leading to failure requires a token in place
Cause to be present in order to occur. Upon failure, a
token will be deposited in place Failure, enabling the
transition Repair, which restores the state of the unit, as
well as transition Propagation, which as suggested by
its name might be used to model a further cause of failure
for another process unit.
Although the originally proposed Petri nets did not
include probabilistic elements, it is quite natural to con-
sider the time associated to transitions as being drawn
from probabilistic distributions. This class of Petri nets
is often called stochastic Petri nets (SPNs) [7]. The firing
of tokens can be also dependent on complex functions of
the markings, and it is possible to conduct Monte Carlo
simulations to evaluate interesting measures about the
likelihood of the occurrence of events. In this work, we
use SANs [31], which can be considered an extension of
SPNs. The SAN formalism is implemented in the Möbius
modeling tool [8], which features useful extensions that
allow for compact models and faster simulation. This step
of the methodology is further detailed in the “Modeling of
domino effects” section.
Assumptions
Our modeling methodology is based on a set of assump-
tions, which are listed in the following.
1. The time to failure of a process unit, causing leakage
of flammable material, is characterized by a gamma
distribution.
2. The only unwanted event resulting from leakage of
flammable material is a VCE. In fact, in this work, we
Fig. 2 Petri net example
are specifically interested in assessing the probability
of occurrence of a domino effect following a VCE
event.
3. A failure occurring at a tank immediately causes a
VCE. As explained in the “Modeling of one-step VCE
propagation” section, this is not the case in reality, as
some additional conditions must hold. However, by
assuming a deterministic occurrence of VCEs upon
unit failure, we are considering the worst-case
scenario.
4. A process unit may be affected by a VCE only once
for the duration of the analyzed scenario. We are in
fact interested in analyzing a single domino effect
chain in isolation.
5. Propagation of a VCE event to a nearby equipment, if
it occurs, is instantaneous (i.e., the propagation delay
is negligible).
6. The occurrence of a VCE event on equipment i
causes a cost CVi for the plant owner, where the
superscript V stands for VCE. This value considers
both direct cost (e.g., damage to equipment) and
indirect cost (e.g., plant downtime).
7. Preventive maintenance is performed periodically on
equipment units. The maintenance period of
equipment i is deterministic and denoted as TMi ,
where the superscript M stands for maintenance.
After maintenance, the equipment is considered as
good as new.
8. The execution of preventive maintenance of
equipment i has a cost of CMi for the plant owner.
These assumptions are reasonable considering that our
objective is analyzing exactly the chain of VCE events.
Relaxing these assumptions, particularly item 2 above, is
part of our future work.
Metrics of interest
The objective of this work is to provide stakeholders
(e.g., chemical plant owners) with a tool to compare dif-
ferent design choices in planning the layout of chemical
infrastructures. For this reason, we focus on concise met-
rics that can provide a good indication of the safety (i.e.,
absence of catastrophic failures [29]) and the expected
cost of the analyzed configuration. With this in mind,
we define the following measures, where t represents
time:
– Fi(t), defined as the probability that unit i will be
affected by a VCE not later than t.
– Nfail(t), defined as the average number of process
units that will be affected by a VCE before or on time
t.
– C(t), defined as the expected cost for the plant owner
up to time t.
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The first metric can be used as an indicator of the level
of risk of unit i, for a given layout and a given time win-
dow. It can be used to identify the units that are subject
to the highest hazard level. Instead, the second metric
is an indicator of the safety level of the whole layout
scenario, for a given time window. It can be used to com-
paratively evaluate different alternative layouts. Finally,
the third metric is an indicator of the adequacy of the
maintenance plan and can be used to identify the best
trade-offs between maintenance frequency and chance of
occurrence of domino effects.
To be able to calculate such metrics, we first have
to characterize the occurrence of VCE events and
their propagation (“Modeling of one-step VCE propa-
gation” section), and then construct the model repre-
senting the domino effect (“Modeling of domino effects”
section).
Modeling of one-step VCE propagation
As anticipated earlier, in this paper, we use the multi-
energy method for overpressure calculation within the
propagation modeling step (see Fig. 1). The multi-energy
method for calculating the overpressure, for a given
distance of interest, is summarized in the following
steps [3].
1. Cloud characterization. This step aims at finding the
amount of released mass in the cloud, which often
requires dispersion calculations. Since these
calculations are not the main focus of this work, an
overall mass is approximated for cloud calculations.
This mass must at least correspond to the
stoichiometric quantity required for combustion to
occur.
2. Calculation of released energy. The amount of
released energy will correspond to the product of the
volume of the mixture and the amount of energy
released per cubic meter. The volume used in this
step must take into consideration the mass calculated
in the previous step. However, only the confined part
of the cloud, i.e., the part of the cloud that is in a
confined space or obstructed should be considered,
as unconfined parts would burn out without
significantly increasing the pressure.
3. Distance scaling. Scaling laws exist for modeling the
physical properties of explosions, which relate the
properties of blast waves from different explosions.
Such laws allow extrapolating the blast wave
properties of explosions from data obtained under
different conditions (e.g., different amount of
explosive, different distance). Based on E, the
released energy calculated in the previous step, a
scaled distance R¯ is first calculated, as a function of
the distance R and the atmospheric pressure Pa, as
follows1:




4. Overpressure calculation. From the scaled distance
R¯, a corresponding scaled overpressure can be found
based on a Sachs-scaled side-on overpressure graph,
as the one shown in Fig. 3. Such charts correlate
dimensionless (scaled) values of overpressure and
distance, based on the assumed source strength or
severity of the explosion, which ranges from 1
(lowest) to 10 (highest). This value must be specified
for the cloud according to level of confinement in the
area. A value of 7 is used in this work (corresponding
to congested areas). Once the scaled overpressure
has been determined, the final overpressure value is
found by a further rescaling by Pa, the atmospheric
pressure value.
After the first event has happened (i.e., a vapor cloud has
exploded), it can propagate to other equipment, resulting
in a domino effect. That is, if other hazardous equip-
ment is present nearby, the overpressure generated by the
explosion may damage it, causing the release of additional
flammable material, which in turn may generate other
VCE events.
This propagation is not deterministic, but rather prob-
abilistic, as it depends on several factors (e.g., released
energy, distance). Several literature approaches have
developed empirical models to relate escalation proba-
bilities to overpressure received from a blast wave, e.g.,
[38]. The authors of [9] proposed a probit model to esti-
mate the escalation probability from overpressure values
of vapor cloud explosions in atmospheric tanks, by first
determining a factor Y as follows:
Y = −18.96 + 2.44ln(P), (6)
with P being the overpressure, and then using φ(·),
the cumulative distribution function of the standard nor-
mal distribution, to calculate Pe, the escalation probability,
as Pe = φ(Y − 5). The obtained probability value Pe is
thus the probability that a VCE event would escalate to
another equipment located at a certain distance R, causing
a subsequent VCE event.
Based on the specific scenario to be analyzed, such
probability values need to be estimated for each value of
the distance between pair of equipment that might prop-
agate a VCE event. We shall be using these estimated
probabilities to parametrize the DTMC and SAN models
1In the conference version of this paper [33], this formula wrongly appeared
without the cube root for a mistake in the processing of the document. The
number were however calculated with the correct formula, which is the one
reported in Eq. 5.
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Fig. 3 Sachs-scaled side-on overpressure chart [3]
that allows predicting the likelihood of domino effects
resulting from an initiating VCE.
Modeling of domino effects
In this section, we present two distinct types of mod-
els that can be used to estimate the metrics of inter-
est defined in “Metrics of interest” section. We use a
DTMC modeling to represent the propagation of VCEs
once the initial event has occurred: since we are assum-
ing propagation times are negligible, actual times can be
totally abstracted and the study of domino consequences
can be conducted in an exact way, without using simula-
tion. Then, to deal with the time distribution of VCE initial
events, we build SAN models of the equipment units,
which can be composed to define a model of the whole
plant, and analyzed by discrete-event simulation to deter-
mine time-dependent metrics of interest. In the following,
we shall be describing the two modeling approaches.
DTMCmodel
For the sake of our modeling, we are here considering
the chain of events that occur in a plant right after the
occurrence of an initial VCE event, say on unit i, until no
more explosion events can happen.
Let us suppose that a unit i in the plant just exploded.
Then, each other equipment unit j will be subject to an
overpressure wave and, depending on its distance from i, it
will suffer a VCE with some known probability pij. In case
j explodes, the same process will repeat and other units
may be affected. If no unit explodes, the whole domino
effect stops.
Since the times of propagation are negligible, we can
model the system by a DTMC {Xm,m ≥ 0}. The state
variable of the process is the collection of the states
of the n equipment units in the plant, i.e., Xm =
(U1m,U2m, . . . ,Unm) and the state of each unit can be in the
discrete set Si = {0, 1, 2}, where:
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– 0models the initial state, that is, the normal condition
of the unit, susceptible to be affected by explosions;
– 1 stands for active, that is the unit is suffering the
consequences of a VCE, and can propagate it to other
units;
– 2 represents the final state exploded, when a unit has
already suffered the consequences of a VCE, and
cannot anymore propagate it.
A transition from the initial state 0 to state 1 will model
the fact that a unit has been affected by an explosion.
After reaching state 1, the next state of the unit will then
become 2 with probability 1, and will not change anymore.
However, before reaching this final state, the unit may
propagate an explosion to all other units in state 0. The
global state of the chain evolves in discrete-time accord-
ing to the propagation of VCE events, i.e., the number of
units in state 0 decreases over time and it becomes con-
stant (it may reach zero) when the propagation process
has stopped.
With such a state representation, the initial state of the
model will be one of those in which exactly one unit is in
state 1 and all other units are in the 0 state. The propaga-
tion process can continue until at least one unit is in state
1 and ends if the state does not include any unit in the 1
state. The total possible number of states is 3n−1, because
the state where all units are in state 0 is not included.
The one-step transition probabilities between states of the
chain can be expressed in terms of the explosion propaga-
tion probabilities pij. To provide a compact notation, it is
convenient to introduce, for x ∈ R and u ∈ Rn, the indi-
cator function I(x, u) = (I(x,u1), I(x,u2), . . . , I(x,un)),
where I(x,ui) = 1 if ui = x and I(x,ui) = 0 otherwise, for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n. For vectors in Rn, we shall be denoting by
‖·‖1 the norm-1 of a vector (the sum of the absolute values
of the vector entries), and we will be using the comparison
operator ≥ component-wise.
We can now describe θu,v, the probability that the
DTMC {Xm,m ≥ 0} jumps from a state u =
(u1,u2, . . . ,un) to a state v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn). Let us first
observe that, for the transition probability to be non-zero,
the following must hold of u and v:
‖I(0, u)‖1 ≥
∥∥I(0, v)∥∥1 (7)
I(2, v) = I(2, u) + I(1, u) (8)
Then, for any two states u and v that satisfy both Eqs. 7
and 8, the transition probability θu,v has the form θu,v =∏n




1 if ui = 1
1 if ui = 2∑
j∈A pj,i if ui = 0 ∧ vi = 1∏
j∈A(1 − pj,i) if ui = 0 ∧ vi = 0
and A is the set defined as A = {j|I(1, u)j = 1}, i.e., the
set of indices of the units that in state u can propagate an
explosion (state is 1). For any two states u and v that do
not satisfy either Eqs. 7 or 8, it is θu,v = 0.
Such a DTMC is an absorbing stochastic process as,
independently from the initial state, it will surely termi-
nate its evolution in a state v where no unit is in state 1
(i.e.,
∥∥I(1, v)∥∥1 = 0). Out of the 3n − 1 states, 2n − 1 are
absorbing states and the other 3n − 2n are transient states.
Figure 4 shows an example of the state-transition diagram
of the DTMC, when n = 3 units are considered, and the
initial state of the system is (1, 0, 0), i.e., unit 1 is exploding
and units 2 and 3 are susceptible to explode.
To analyze the consequences of domino effects, it is suf-
ficient to determine the absorption probabilities of the
chain, which provide the likelihood of the system to end
the domino propagation in the states with any given num-
ber of exploded units. This is easily accomplished by
simple linear algebra, as follows. Let P be the matrix that
collects the one-step transition probabilities θu,v of the
DTMC. Then, by a proper ordering of the states, P can be






where Q and R are the sub-matrices that collect the
transition probabilities between transient states and from
transient to absorbing states, respectively. Then, matrix
(I − Q)−1 · R provides the limit conditional absorption
probabilities, i.e., the probability that the chain will end
its evolution in any of the absorbing states, given the ini-
tial state [18]. From such conditional probabilities, the
measures of interest can be computed. For instance, if
α is the vector that assigns the initial state probability
distribution, and β the vector whose jth entry is the num-
ber of exploded units of the jth absorbing state, then the
average number of exploded units can be computed as
α · (I − Q)−1 · R · β .
SANmodel
In this section, we describe the SAN model of the
VCE domino effect. This model complements the DTMC
model of the previous section with the possibility to rep-
resent (i) random occurrences of the initial events and
(ii) maintenance activities. However, as opposed to the
DTMC model, it cannot be evaluated in exact form, and
we shall use discrete-event simulation to evaluate the
metrics of interest.
Templatemodels
One of the objectives of the methodology we are propos-
ing is to facilitate the evaluation of the VCE risk associated
to different scenarios in a chemical plants. To achieve this
objective we adopt a “template-based” approach for the
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Fig. 4 Example DTMC state transition diagram. Dashed contour for transient states, solid contour for absorbing ones
construction of the SANmodel, according to the approach
introduced in [20], in which a library of basic parametric
models are first defined. Then, such models are instanti-
ated multiple times and connected together to obtain the
global models corresponding to the intended scenarios.
The reusability and maintanability of models is there-
fore improved: submodels can be modified in isolation
from the rest of the model, can be substituted with more
refined implementations, and can be rearranged based on
modifications in system configuration. Most importantly,
using such approach facilitates the automated composi-
tion of SAN models for different scenarios based on their
high-level specification [20].
The tankmodel
In this work, we exemplify the template-based modeling
by using only a single template, the Tank model. This is
justified by the specific case study we will be dealing with
in the “Case study” section. Its graphical representation
using the SAN notation is shown in Fig. 5, together with
its parameters. Places highlighted with a dashed yellow
rectangle are interface places of the template, that is, those
that will be used for composition with other instances.
Parameters of the template include the parameters of the
gamma distribution that regulates the initial VCE event in
the tank (k, λ), the number of nearby pieces of equipment
which may be affected by propagation (n), the probabil-
ity that propagation of the VCE actually occurs for each of
them (p1, . . . , pn), the time interval at which maintenance
is executed on the tank (TM), the cost of the execution
of maintenance on the tank (CM), and the cost of the
occurrence of a VCE event on the tank (CV ).
Note that the image in Fig. 5 actually shows the struc-
ture of the model for a tank with four neighboring units
(i.e., n = 5), as the ones that will be used in the case
study presented in the “Case study” section. The number
of nearby units is however configurable with parameter n,
and the model can be automatically altered to reflect a dif-
ferent value. The structure of the model is described in the
following.
Initially, the Healthy place contains one token, repre-
senting that the tank is in good conditions (i.e., no leaking
of flammable material). A tank in good conditions may be
affected by a VCE for two reasons: either (i) it is the one
directly causing the initiating event or (ii) it is affected by
propagation from a VCE occurring in one of the nearby
pieces of equipment.
The first case is represented by the VCE activity, which
is distributed according to a gamma distribution with
parameters (k, λ) and it is enabled when there is a token
in the Healthy place. When the VCE transition fires, it
means that a leakage of flammable material has occurred
and the subsequent VCE event occurred (as per assump-
tions in the “Assumptions” section). The token is then
removed form the Healthy place, and one is added to
places Exploded and InitialOccurred. The place
InitialOccurred is shared between all the instances
of the template, and it is used to block subsequent initial
events after one has occurred (we assumed a single initial
event).
The second case, in which the tank is affected by incom-
ing propagation, is represented by place Propagation1
and the immediate activity Cascade. Propagation1
is also an interface place, that is, it is shared with
other instances of the Tank template, representing the
other tanks in the scenario. In case one of the other
tanks successfully propagates a VCE event to the tank
represented by the model (assume Tank #1), a token
gets added to place Propagation1. Such token trig-
gers activity Cascade, which removes the token from
Propagation1 and adds one to Exploded.
Independently from the reason why a VCE event has
been triggered, the presence of a token in Exploded
triggers the Overpressure instantaneous activity,
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Fig. 5 Template SAN model for an atmospheric tank
representing the propagation of the overpressure wave
and the possible triggering of a cascading VCE event.
Propagation to each individual tank occurs with a differ-
ent probability, based on the distance at which it is located
from the tank that suffered the initial event (see the
“Modeling methodology” section). This aspect is mod-
eled by the instantaneous activities Propagatei, each
one representing propagation to a different tank. Each of
these activities may have two different outcomes (cases),
probabilistically chosen: propagation occurs (pi) or not
(1 − pi). The actual probability values {p2, . . . , pn} are
parameters of the template model, and are calculated in
the previous step of our methodology.
In case propagation occurs, one token is added
to the corresponding Propagatedi places (e.g.,
Propagated2 for Tank #2). Such places are also inter-
face places, and they are analogous to Propagated1
for the other instances of the Tank template model. This
is how the modeling of the domino effect is achieved,
and any VCE event in a tank can cascade multiple times,
potentially causing a VCE event in all the tanks in the
scenario.
Maintenance is modeled by the timed activity
Maintenance, whose firing time is deterministic with
parameter TM. If the parameter Menabled is set to true,
then the place WaitRepair contains a token, and the
activity Maintenance is thus enabled. Upon firing, a
token is removed from WaitRepair and one is added to
DoRepair. When there is a token in place DoRepair,
the reactivation function [31] of activity VCE triggers
a reactivation, that is, the firing time of the activity is
resampled from the associated probability distribution.
This mechanism effectively models the repair of the
component to one as good as new. Finally, the instanta-
neous activity MaintenanceEnd removes a token from
DoRepair and adds one to WaitRepair, enabling the
activtiy Maintenance again for the next maintenance
period.
Overall model andmetric specification
The overall model of a scenario is obtained by creating
multiple instances of the Tank template model and con-
necting together all the Propagatedi interface places
having the same name. This is illustrated, visually, in
Fig. 6b. All the instances of the template are connected
using the Rep/Join state-sharing formalism [30] (Fig. 6b).
In this way, cascading effects of VCE events are automati-
cally taken into account by the SAN model (Fig. 6a).
Once the model of the complete scenario has been con-
structed, the measures defined in the “Metrics of interest”
section need to be specified in terms of the SAN model.
This is typically done by defining reward variables [41].
In our case, the target measures can be computed as
follows.




1 if #(Tanki.Healthy) = 0
0 otherwise,
where #(Tanki.Healthy) is the marking of the
Healthy place in the i th instance of the Tank
template.
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Fig. 6Multiple instances of the Tank template model are connected together using the Join state-sharing formalism (b). In this way, cascading
effects are automatically taken into account by the SAN model (a)
– Nfail(t) is the expected value, at time t, of the
following reward variable:




where #(Tanki.Healthy) is the marking of the
Healthy place in the i th instance of the Tank
template, and n is the total number of tanks in the
scenario.










where #(Tanki.Healthy) is the marking of the
Healthy place in the i th instance of the Tank
template, #(Maintenancei) is the number of
firings (time it has fired) of the activity
Maintenance of the i th instance of the Tank
template, n is the total number of tanks in the
scenario, and CMi and CVi are the cost associated to
maintenance and occurrence of VCE event for the i th
tank.
Case study
As it is common practice in the literature, atmospheric
storage tanks containing gasoline are considered for the
evaluation of the proposed methodology.
We consider five gasoline tanks and five different lay-
out scenarios to be compared. The candidate layouts are
shown in Fig. 7a–e. In the figures, we show the distances
that represent the main input to the calculation of the
Pe probabilities, according to the procedure described
in the “Modeling of one-step VCE propagation” section.
Parameters a and b, which define the size of the consid-
ered area, are set to 80 m and 120 m, respectively.
As for the failures of the tanks, (i.e., occurrence time of
initiating VCE events), they all follow the same gamma
distribution. The value for the rate parameter λ has been
set based on the data in [4], considering the equipment
“3.6.1.1 VESSELS-ATMOSPHERIC-METALLIC.” Based
on such data, the average failure rate for such equipment is
0.985 failures per 106 h, that is, λ = 9.85 ·10−7 h−1. We set
the shape parameter to k = 1.5; this means that the event
of interest (occurrence of a VCE) occurs every 1.5 failures
of the tank itself, that is, on 2/3 of the occasions. While
this is a reasonable value for the purpose of this paper, a
more accurate investigation of this parameter will be part
of our future work.
In the following, we perform three distinct types of
evaluations for the possible layout designs:
1. A what-if analysis, to estimate the consequences of a
failure affecting Tank #1 with probability 1 at time 0;
2. Atransient analysis, considering domino effects
caused by the occurrence at random times of tank
failures;
3. A cost analysis, which takes into account the
execution of periodic maintenance on the effects of
failure occurrence and propagation.
Since the first type of analysis does not require modeling
the time of occurrence of the events, the DTMC model
is used for the what-if analysis. The other two analyses
will be instead based on the SAN model, evaluated with
the discrete-event simulator provided with the Möbius
framework [8].
Results obtainedwith the DTMCmodel are exact, while,
when not specified otherwise, each value computed by
simulation is estimated with a confidence level of 95% and
a confidence interval of no more than 5% relative width.
What-if analysis
In this section, we report the results of the what-if anal-
ysis described above, which has the objective to assess
the potential VCE domino effects caused by a failure of
Tank #1. This same analysis can be repeated to consider
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Fig. 7 Layouts scenarios for evaluation (a = 80, b = 120 meters). a Layout of scenario A. b Layout of scenario B. c Layout of scenario C. d Layout of
scenario D. e Layout of scenario E
the case when the initial event happens to any other
unit. The results of the evaluation of Fi and Nfail for the
five considered scenarios are shown in Fig. 8. Since we
assumed that failure propagation among tanks is instanta-
neous, we use the DTMC model to evaluate the metrics.
Results for Tank #1 have not been included in the figures,
because it is assumed that the initiating event occurs in
such tank for all scenarios, and as such F1 is constant with
value 1.0.
For the considered case study, our modeling methodol-
ogy provides results that are easily interpreted. In fact, the
layout with a linear placement of tanks (scenario A) has
the highest individual probabilities of explosion among all
the scenarios. This is indeed the configuration in which
tanks are closer, with a minimum distance between them
of b/4 (i.e., 30 m). When the average spacing between
equipment is increased, clearly it becomes less probable
for a VCE to affect adjacent equipment. Overall, scenarios
A and C present the highest probability of domino effects,
while scenarios B, D, and E are less risky in comparison to
the other layouts.
However, a greater distance from the first tank (which,
we recall, in this evaluation always serves the purpose
of generating the initiating event) does not necessar-
ily mean a lower probability of explosion, as close-
ness with other equipment can trigger domino effects.
Such effect can be clearly seen in scenario A, where
the closeness of equipment units among each other
has the results of increasing the probability of domino
effects by one order of magnitude in comparison to
the other scenarios. In fact, in scenario A even for
equipment that is farther from the detonation point
(Tank #5), the probability of being affected by the VCE
domino effect is one order of magnitude higher than the
maximum experienced by any tank in scenarios B, D, and
E (Fig. 8a).
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Fig. 8 Results of the what-if analysis assessing the impact of a VCE occurring on Tank #1. a Probability of a domino VCE event affecting the other
four tanks in the different scenarios. b The average number of tanks affected by VCE for each scenario
Nevertheless, by analyzing the plot for Fi (Fig. 8a), it is
not straightforward to understand which out of the five
scenarios is the safest one on average. For example, in sce-
nario B, the probability of explosion for Tank #2 is lower
than in scenario D, but for Tank #3, it is the opposite.
Similarly, the probability of explosion for Tank #5 is the
lowest in scenario E, but for Tank #2, it is the lowest in
scenario C.
The overall safety of the different layouts with respect
to a VCE occurring on the first tank can be better under-
stood by analyzing the Nfail metric (Fig. 8b). From that
figure, it can be clearly understood that, under these
assumptions, scenario B is the one resulting in the low-
est average number of tanks being affected by the domino
effect, while D and E are almost equivalent with respect
to this metric. There is however a difference for Tank #5;
in fact, F5 is lower in the last scenario because it is farther
from the initiating event and far enough from the other
tanks as well.
This kind of evaluation can help identifying certain pat-
terns that, although clear in those specific scenarios, can
be more difficult to devise in complex layouts. Also, this
evaluation has highlighted the complementary nature of
the two proposed metrics in performing what-if analysis.
It is worthwhile noticing that the results reported in
Fig. 8b correspond to those previously obtained in ([33],
Fig. 11f ). However, in this paper, they are calculated using
the DTMC model, so they are exact, while in [33], they
had been just statistically estimated by discrete-event sim-
ulation. With respect to the previous version of the paper,
Fig. 8b uses the linear scale instead of the logarithmic one,
and we have added the value of 1 toNfail, corresponding to
the failure of the tank on which the initiating event occurs.
Transient analysis
In this section, we perform a transient analysis of the
model, that is, we evaluate how the probability of VCE
domino effect occurrence changes with time. In this
evaluation, we assume that the initiating event can occur
in any of the five atmospheric gas tanks.
We used such values to evaluate the metric Fi(t) for all
the tanks and all the scenarios at the instant of time of
43800 h, roughly corresponding to 5 years. The results
of such evaluation are reported in Fig. 9. The left part of
the figure (Fig. 9a) shows the average number of tanks
that would suffer a VCE (either because of a tank failure
or a domino effect), without performing any maintenance
activities.
The results confirm the ones obtained in the previous
evaluation, that is, scenarios A and C are the ones that are
most affected by the domino effects of VCEs. The results
in Fig. 9 also confirm that the model is able to accurately
distinguish tanks based on their location. In fact, looking
at results for scenario A, the highest probability of explo-
sion is for Tank #3, then for Tank #2 and Tank #4, and
finally for Tank #1 and Tank #5. This is consistent with
the layout of Fig. 7a, in which Tank #3 has the minimum
average distance from the other tanks.
The most interesting result are however the values
obtained for scenarios B, D, and E. While they confirm
Sierra et al. Journal of the Brazilian Computer Society           (2019) 25:11 Page 15 of 19
Fig. 9 Probability of a VCE affecting different tanks on the different scenarios, assuming a random initial event. Values of Fi(t) with
t = 43800 h = 5 years, without any maintenance activity (a) and with preventive maintenance of tanks performed every year (b)
that these three layouts are almost equivalent, the figure
also shows another interesting result. For each tank in
these scenarios, the probability of being affected by a VCE
is almost the same. Furthermore, this value is very close
to the value of the cumulative distribution function of
the gamma distribution regulating the failure process of
individual tanks. In fact:
Prob[ TTF ≤ t] = γ (k, λt)
(k) =
γ (1.5, 9.85 · 10−7 · 43800)
(1.5)
≈ 0.00657. (9)
The resulting value is highlighted in the figure by a
dashed black line. As visible in Fig. 9a, this value is
very close to the value of Fi(t) obtained for all the
tanks in scenarios B, D, and E. This means that, in such
layouts, the domino effect does not add significant con-
tribution to the probability of a tank being affected by
a VCE. The same is not true for scenarios A and C,
which instead are significantly affected. This is consis-
tent with the results we obtained in [33]. Hence, we may
formulate the hypothesis that changing the probability
distribution of the occurrence time of initiating events
does not affect the relative hazard proneness of layout
scenarios.
Figure 9b shows the same results when preventive main-
tenance is performed at scheduled intervals of 8760 h
(∼1 year). Following the same considerations as before,
we note that scenario A is particularly unsafe even with
such a reasonable maintenance policy. In fact, even in
this case, the probability of a tank suffering a VCE is still
higher than the threshold given by the value of the cumu-
lative distribution function regulating the occurrence of
VCE on individual tanks. We can then conclude that sce-
nario A must be avoided, while we can consider scenario
C under the condition that yearly maintenance activities
are scheduled.
We note that the results in Fig. 9b could not be obtained
with the previous version of the model, as it did not
consider maintenance. This demonstrates the usefulness
of the extension offered in this paper and how it could
be used in practice to evaluate the appropriateness of a
certain layout.
Cost analysis
A complementary perspective for deciding whether main-
tenance activities should be planned, and how often, is
to analyze the expected costs to be undertaken by the
plant owner. The occurrence of an unsafe event, and its
propagation due to domino effects, has a cost in terms of
damage to equipment, loss of material, harm to personnel,
etc. At the same time, however, periodic maintenance has
also a cost, in terms of labor, subsitution of equipment,
and downtime of the production process.
Once appropriate safety levels are respected, the most
convenient maintenance policy is thus the one that min-
imizes the total expected cost, that is, the maintenance
cost plus the expected costs due to VCE events. This met-
ric corresponds exactly to C(t) defined in the “Met- rics of
interest” section and can be evaluated using the method-
ology defined in this paper. We note that this kind of
analysis could not be performed with the model in [33],
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as it did not take into account maintenance activities nor
costs.
We perform a cost analysis considering three differ-
ent values of λ for tanks, and different maintenance
periods ranging from 6 months to 5 years, at incre-
ments of 6 months. The failure rates used in this anal-
ysis are taken from the same source [4], which contains
“lower,” “average,” and “upper” values for the failure rate
of atmospheric vessels. For the purpose of this evaluation,
we assume that an unsafe event produces a cost two order
of magnitude greater than the execution of maintenance,
that is, we setCMi =10 andCVi =1000 for all the tanks.We
accumulate the costs until time t = 175200 h (20 years),
that is, we assume a lifespan of the system of 20 years.
Results of this analysis for scenario B are reported in
Fig. 10. We focus on scenario B because it has been identi-
fied as the least prone to domino effects, and thus, it is the
most recommended in terms of safety. Figure 10a shows
the result for the “average” value of λ in [4], which is also
the value used in previous evaluations. In this case, adopt-
ing the most frequent maintenance (6 months) has almost
the same cost as not performing maintenance at all, while
the most convenient maintenance period is 3 years.
Figure 10b shows the results when using the “high”
value of λ, that is, tanks fail more frequently. In this case,
any of the considered frequency options for the execu-
tion of maintenance reduces the costs with respect to
not performing maintenance at all. The best policy in
Fig. 10 Analysis of expected costs of scenario B after 20 years, considering different frequencies of execution of preventive maintenance and
different values for the λ parameter of tanks. a λ = 9.85 · 10−7 h−1 (“average”). b λ = 3.02 · 10−6 h−1 (“high”). c λ = 1.27 · 10−7 h−1 (“low”)
Sierra et al. Journal of the Brazilian Computer Society           (2019) 25:11 Page 17 of 19
this case is to perform maintenance every year. Finally,
the result when using the “low” value for λ are depicted
in Fig. 10c. In this case, maintenance only increases the
overall costs, without actually producing any benefit. The
best policy in this case is to not perform maintenance,
at least during the considered timespan of the system of
20 years.
Limitations to validity
The work presented in this paper is based on a set of
assumptions, which are described in the “Assumptions”
section. Themain limitations therefore concern the extent
to which such assumptions are realistic and the generaliz-
ability of the methodology.
Most of the assumptions that have been introduced
were justified in the “Assumptions” section, and they have
been devised following common practice from the liter-
ature. Nevertheless, two strong assumptions were intro-
duced that may limit the validity of results. The first
one is that the only possible failure mode is a VCE.
The second is that the domino effect among different
pieces of equipment, if it occurs, is immediate. This is
not always the case in reality. However, from the perspec-
tive of evaluating the domino effects of VCEs, we note
that both assumptions are considering the worst case. The
results are thus conservative with respect to the actual
safety of the system configuration against VCE domino
effects.
Approximations are also introduced by blast estimation,
which adopts a simplified model of the explosion effects.
We mitigated this aspect by using a well-established blast
estimation method from the literature, the multi-energy
method. To further mitigate this aspect, the method
can be calibrated following an approach similar to the
one in [27].
Finally, in this paper, we have analyzed a limited set of
scenarios. Namely, we limited our analysis to the layouts
reproduced in Fig. 7, and to the failure of Tank #1 for
what concerns the what-if analysis. Deeper validation of
the methodology would require its application to different
scenarios andwith different set of parameters and possibly
its validation against historical data from real accidents as
done by the authors of [2].
Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we tackled the problem of assessing
the safety of chemical plants, taking into considera-
tion the types of equipment and of materials being
processed, as well as its physical layout. The problem
of trading-off area and piping costs (which results in
dense layouts) with the expected costs incurred in case
of accidents (which are higher in dense layouts) is a
complex one, as it requires integrating diverse types of
information.
We focused on the safety issues posed by VCEs, and
we proposed a methodology based on probabilistic mod-
eling to assess the consequences of domino effects. Our
modeling methodology considered a standard characteri-
zation of the initiation events, and it used probit models
to estimate the likelihood of explosion propagation, tak-
ing into account the distances between equipment units.
These elements were integrated into probabilistic models
that allow analyzing general cases of plant layouts.
We exercised the models on a case study composed by
several atmospheric gasoline tanks. We compared safety-
related metrics for various possible layouts of the tanks in
the same physical space, showing that our approach allows
determining interesting options for spacing elements and
for trading the expected cost of VCEs and of preventive
maintenance. Future work aims at validating the method-
ology by further applying it on different plant layouts and
with different parameter settings.
The research results presented in this work represent a
first concrete step for quantitatively assessing the safety
of plant layouts. Further research could be conducted to
better characterize in a quantitative way domino effect
exposure, specifically on more robust models accounting
for unwanted events other than VCEs. A more accu-
rate calculation of domino effect probabilities would be
possible by improving dispersion calculations for partial
confinement and turbulence calculations within the vapor
cloud.
Another direction for future work consists in improv-
ing the modularity of the SAN model and automating
model construction, directly taking as input a layout of
the chemical plant. In this perspective, we plan to inves-
tigate the application of model-driven engineering (MDE)
techniques [19, 32], with the objective to automatically
derive our probabilistic model from a high-level descrip-
tion of the physical layout of the infrastructure under
analysis.
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